Multi-agent negotiation in the Prestige oil spill response scenario: a conflict resolution mechanism design and simulations

Abstract

Contingency management facing an imminent oil spill is often a difficult task as the long-term consequences of decisions generally affect the interests of different stakeholder groups - including the broad public. We suggest here that a balanced response scheme can be achieved by integrating various interests within a vir-tual negotiation process. This paper designs a hybrid negotiation protocol where multiple issues including money compensation are traded by parties. Aiming to examine appropriate designs of this process in multi-agent systems, we simulate negotiations based on the Prestige oil spill response scenario. Experiment results show that this designed protocol may work as a robust conflict resolution mech-anism for deriving a multi-agent consensus. Finally, by comparing two different rational strategies taken by agents, we add support to the view that learning tech-niques help agents to improve their payoffs in negotiations.